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loopholes in existing federal law.1  Specifically, BCRA sought to 
reduce or eliminate the use of so-called “soft money”—funds not 
subject to the source and amount restrictions imposed on direct 
campaign contributions—to influence federal elections.2  To 
achieve this goal, BCRA substantially expanded the scope of federal 
regulation to include activities that relate to or could affect federal 
elections, such as communications about persons who are federal 
candidates during the period leading up to an election, as well as 
voter registration and get-out-the-vote activities.3
As the scope of federal regulation expands, it increasingly 
comes into contact and conflict with state-level election activity.  To 
the extent that federal regulations affect the activities of political 
actors in state candidate elections, they have only moderate impact 
because most states regulate the source and amount of 
contributions to candidate elections in a way that echoes the 
requirements of federal law.  Expanding federal regulation in this 
area therefore does not require substantial modifications in the 
behavior of those who attempt to influence state elections that 
occur in tandem with federal elections. 
However, state ballot measures pose a very different problem.  
In the twenty-four U.S. states with the power of initiative or 
referendum,4 citizens have the constitutional right to vote directly 
on proposed constitutional and statutory amendments.  Also, 
citizens in the states with initiative have the power to propose 
amendments themselves.  Perhaps because there is no equivalent 
federal authority, federal law has never particularly focused on this 
area of state election activity.  The Internal Revenue Service even 
treats state political committees organized to support ballot 
measures in a different category of tax exemption than political 
committees organized to support either federal or state 
candidates.5   
With the expansion of federal regulation, state-level ballot 
measure activities are now within the ambit of federal regulation.  
But under existing Supreme Court precedent, contributions to 
       1.    See infra Part II. 
       2.    Id. 
       3.    Id. 
       4.    M. DANE WATERS, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM ALMANAC 11 (2003). 
 5. Judith E. Kindall & John Francis Reilly, Election Year Issues, 2002 EXEMPT 
ORGS. CONTINUING PROF’L EDUC. TEXT 402, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/ 
irs-tege/eotopici02.pdf. 
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ballot measure campaigns cannot be limited by source or amount.6  
Consequently, tensions have resulted from this new interaction 
between federal regulation and state citizens’ exercise of their 
retained legislative power. 
This article explores the tensions between the federal desire to 
stamp out political activity that evades campaign finance reform 
efforts and the deference due in our federalist system to states 
whose citizens have chosen to retain legislative power over 
initiatives and referenda.  We proceed by setting forth a brief 
history of the initiative and referendum power and of federal 
campaign finance law,7 followed by a more in-depth description of 
the expansive provisions in BCRA and their impact on ballot 
measure activities.8  We conclude with recommendations about 
how to balance the competing interests and concerns of federal 
regulators and state citizens involved in direct democracy.9
I. THE NATURE OF AND JUSTIFICATION FOR DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN 
THE STATES 
Both initiative (citizens’ power to propose constitutional or 
statutory amendments) and referendum (citizen ratification of 
legislative measures) are forms of direct democracy.  Direct 
democracy has existed in the United States since colonial times, 
when town hall meetings in New England colonies served as forums 
for citizen-proposed ordinances.10  Some of the Framers expressed 
strong opposition to direct democracy, favoring instead a 
republican structure of government to filter and diminish the 
factionalism they feared was inherent in purely democratic rule.11  
Others believed that some forms of direct democracy were a 
necessary recognition of their shared theory that the people were 
sovereign and that the existence of government was justified only 
       6.    See infra Part II.   
       7.    Id. 
       8.    See infra Part III.  
       9.    See infra Part IV. 
 10. WATERS, supra note 4, at 3; K.K. DuVivier, State Ballot Initiatives in the 
Federal Preemption Equation: A Medical Marijuana Case Study, 40 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 221, 230 (2005). 
 11. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 61–62 (James Madison) (Jacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961).  For a more complex and detailed account of the views of the 
Founders on direct and popular democracy, see Alan Gibson, Democracy and the 
Founders’ Constitution: Toward a Balanced Assessment, in UNDERSTANDING THE 
FOUNDING: THE CRUCIAL QUESTIONS 46–90 (2007). 
3
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by the consent of the governed.12  To that end, the Framers 
determined that ratification of the U.S. Constitution should be by 
the citizens of the several states sitting in convention, rather than 
by the state legislatures.13
Adoption of direct democracy in the states began with the 
ratification of the Massachusetts Constitution by statewide 
referendum.14  By 1857, Congress required that every new state 
entering the union incorporate the requirement that state 
constitutional changes would be made by legislative proposal 
referred to the people for ultimate adoption, and today, every state 
has a legislative referendum process that permits the legislature to 
refer constitutional and statutory measures to the voters for final 
approval.15  Twenty-four states also permit popular referendums, in 
which the voters may, by petition, refer measures already passed by 
the legislature to the people for them to accept or reject.16
Citizen initiatives, in which citizens can propose constitutional 
and statutory provisions to be adopted by popular vote, arose later 
in our history.  The initiative, along with other measures including 
direct election of senators, primary elections, secret ballots, and 
recall, was part of a package of reforms promoted by the Populist 
 12. WATERS, supra note 4, at 3 (citing Thomas Jefferson’s support for the 
power of legislative referendum in his state’s constitution); see also THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 339 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961): 
As the people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from 
them that the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of 
government hold their power, is derived; it seems strictly consonant to 
the republican theory, to recur to the same original authority . . . 
whenever it may be necessary to enlarge, diminish, or new-model the 
powers of government . . . . 
For an overview of political science research rebutting some of the critiques levied 
by classical political theorists against direct democracy, see Ian Budge, Direct 
Democracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 595, 596–97 (R. 
A. W. Rhodes et al. eds., 2006). 
 13. U.S. CONST. art. VII; see also DuVivier, supra note 10, at 229–30 (noting 
that the Framers’ choice of ratification by convention indicates that their choice of 
a republican form of government did not represent a repudiation of popular 
sovereignty). 
 14. WATERS, supra note 4, at 3.  An earlier attempt to include a requirement 
of conventions to amend the Georgia Constitution failed.  Id.  For a general 
history of state constitutional tradition of direct democracy, see G. Alan Tarr, For 
the People: Direct Democracy in the State Constitutional Tradition, in DEMOCRACY: HOW 
DIRECT?, 87–99 (Eliott Abrams ed., 2002). 
 15. WATERS, supra note 4, at 3, 11; DuVivier, supra note 10, at 230–31.  For a 
detailed account of the circumstances in which citizens in each state obtained the 
power of initiative, referendum, or both, see WATERS, supra note 4, at 37–453. 
 16. WATERS, supra note 4, at 11. 
4
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and Progressive movements that rose to prominence around the 
turn of the twentieth century.17  The Progressives and Populists can 
certainly be seen as self-interested in their support for the popular 
initiative, which provided them with a mechanism to adopt their 
reform platform despite the opposition of the state legislatures they 
were trying to reform.  Nonetheless, by creating a permanent 
mechanism for direct citizen sponsorship of laws, they created a 
mechanism that would likewise benefit future generations in 
resolving issues on which legislative action failed.  The use of the 
initiative in the intervening century has borne out their wishes, 
resulting in the adoption of measures that were unlikely to secure 
legislative approval, such as expanding suffrage, imposing 
legislative term limits, providing for campaign finance reforms and 
publicly funded elections, establishing citizen redistricting 
commissions, and imposing limits on taxation.18  The initiative was 
also used to address controversial social issues including minority 
languages, civil rights, the death penalty, physician-assisted suicide, 
and abortion.19  Many see progress from these measures, but the 
initiative has been critiqued as permitting majority biases to 
trample on individual rights.20  As the use of initiatives and 
referenda have become more frequent and expenditures on 
campaigns for and against such ballot measures have increased, 
critics of direct democracy have also raised concerns about the 
corrupting influence of money on the process, citing large influxes 
of money from single donors, including corporate and labor union 
sources.21
These most recent controversies highlight a key difference 
between state ballot measure campaigns and candidate elections at 
the federal level.  Federal law prohibits the expenditure of 
corporate or union treasury funds to influence an election and 
 17. Id. at 3; Catherine Engberg, Taking the Initiative: May Congress Reform State 
Initiative Lawmaking to Guarantee a Republican Form of Government?, 54 STAN. L. REV. 
569, 573 (2001). 
 18. WATERS, supra note 4, at 7.  For a detailed, interstate analysis and 
comparison of the issues addressed by state ballot measures, see id. at 481–520. 
 19. Id. at 7. 
 20. See Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, 
Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
421, 442 (1998).  See generally Derrick A. Bell, The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to 
Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978).   
 21. See generally DAVID S. BRODER, DEMOCRACY DERAILED: INITIATIVE 
CAMPAIGNS AND THE POWER OF MONEY (2000); PETER SCHRAG, PARADISE LOST: 
CALIFORNIA’S EXPERIENCE, AMERICA’S FUTURE (1998). 
5
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imposes caps on the amount any particular contributor can give 
directly to a candidate campaign or to other groups that make 
expenditures to influence candidate elections, such as political 
action committees and political parties.22  The United States 
Supreme Court struck down attempts to impose such “source” and 
“amount” restrictions on state ballot measure campaigns, finding 
that in the absence of the quid-pro-quo corruption argument that 
applies in the candidate election context, such restrictions cannot 
be supported in the face of the First Amendment’s protections of 
political speech.23  California’s recent attempt to impose amount 
restrictions on contributions to ballot measure committees actually 
controlled by candidates likewise was struck down on constitutional 
grounds, despite legitimate concerns that such candidates are well-
positioned to use the unrestricted funds raised by a committee they 
control for the benefit of their re-election campaigns.24
The lack of source and amount restrictions on contributions to 
committees that support or oppose ballot measures does not mean 
that contributions to ballot measure campaigns are wholly 
unregulated.  Rather, campaign finance regulation in the ballot 
measure arena exists largely in the form of disclosure requirements 
 22. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441a, 441b (Supp. 2005).  See infra Part II for a more detailed 
discussion of these restrictions. 
 23. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) 
(striking down limitations on contributions to ballot measure committees); First 
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776 (1978) (striking down 
prohibition on corporate contributions to ballot measure campaigns).  After the 
Supreme Court’s decision in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003), several 
commentators suggested that the constitutionality of contribution limitations to 
ballot measures might have been revitalized.  See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Rethinking 
the Constitutionality of Contribution & Expenditure Limits in Ballot Measure Campaigns, 
78 S. CAL. L. REV. 885 (2005).  However, those commentators were writing before 
the Court’s subsequent decision in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 127 S. Ct. 2652 
(2007), which seems to tip the balance in favor of the First Amendment where 
policy, rather than candidates, are the subject of discussion. 
 24. Citizens to Save Cal. v. Cal. Fair Political Practices Comm’n, No. 
05AS00555 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 23, 2005), http://www.saccourt.com/geninfo/ 
News_Media/Docs/0555FINAL%20RULING.pdf (preliminarily enjoining rule 
that would impose amount restrictions on candidate-controlled committees on 
both First Amendment and statutory grounds).  The preliminary injunction was 
upheld by the California Court of Appeals, but that court did not reach the 
constitutional issue, holding instead that the rule exceeded the Commission’s 
authority under the relevant statute.  Citizens to Save Cal. v. Cal. Fair Political 
Practices Comm’n, 145 Cal. App. 4th 736, 739 (2006).  The case has now been 
settled.  Press Release, California Fair Political Practices Commission, FPPC Agrees 
to Settlement in Citizens Case (May 21, 2007), www.fppc.ca.gov/index.html?id=48 
&show=detail&prid=648 (last visited Dec. 23, 2007). 
6
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that include listing major funding sources on campaign literature, 
and filing regular and special campaign finance reports listing 
contributions and expenditures.25  States have also imposed 
limitations on the content of ballot measures, in the form of subject 
matter restrictions and single-subject rules designed to eliminate 
logrolling of special interest provisions with generally popular, 
unrelated measures.26  Moreover, ballot measure campaigns are 
subject to a variety of procedural requirements more onerous than 
those imposed on candidates, including petitioning requirements, 
approval by legislative bodies (for some measures), and distribution 
of public information about proposed measures in the form of 
publicity pamphlets and pro/con arguments sent to every eligible 
voter.27  Nonetheless, the differences between this type of 
regulation and the source and amount restrictions imposed by 
federal law lead to conflict when the activity regulated by federal 
law intersects with political activity focused on state ballot 
measures. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MODERN FEDERAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 
AND ITS GRADUAL ENTANGLEMENT IN STATE ELECTIONS 
The Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA),28 the statutory 
backbone of federal campaign finance law, was enacted as a post-
Watergate reform targeted at corruption of public officials through 
 25. See Elizabeth Garrett & Daniel A. Smith, Veiled Political Actors & Campaign 
Disclosure Laws in Direct Democracy, 4 ELECTION L.J. 295, 295 (2005).  Even some 
disclosure regulations have come under successful constitutional attack.  See, e.g., 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (requiring identification 
of anonymous pamphleteer unconstitutional); ACLU v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (discussing constitutionality of requirement that funding sources be 
disclosed on face of campaign literature).  But see Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v. 
Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1107 (9th Cir. 2002) (upholding California’s requirement 
of disclosure of contributions and expenditures); Elizabeth Garrett, McConnell v. 
FEC & Disclosure, 3 ELECTION L.J. 237, 243–44 (2004).  There are those who 
advocate this type of regulation—unlimited contributions coupled with extensive 
disclosure requirements—even in the candidate election context as a better 
solution to what they see as the intractable problem of money in politics.  See 
Richard Briffault, Public Funding and Democratic Elections, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 563, 
564–65 (1999) (summarizing major schools of thought on campaign finance 
reform).  We do not address those arguments here. 
 26. WATERS, supra note 4, at 18–20 (survey of state restrictions on subject 
matter and frequency of initiative and referendum matters). 
 27. Id. at 20–26 (survey of state provisions on petitioning requirements and 
publication of voter guides). 
 28. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified at 2 U.S.C. § 431, et seq. 
(2000)). 
7
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campaign donations and advertising.  The legislation was an 
ambitious combination of contribution limitations, expenditure 
limitations, public financing for Presidential candidates, reporting 
requirements, and the creation of a new independent agency—the 
Federal Election Commission (FEC)—to enforce the law and 
administer a vast public disclosure system.29  This scheme focused 
on the activities of candidates for federal office and political parties 
with regard to federal elections, and had minimal effect on state or 
local elections.30  The U.S. Supreme Court issued a mixed 
judgment on the constitutionality of these reforms in Buckley v. 
Valeo,31 which still generates controversy and sparks policy debates 
thirty years later. 
While Buckley upheld the constitutionality of contribution 
limits, disclosure requirements, and public financing system, it 
struck down all limitations on expenditures by candidates and 
independent groups.32  The Court also limited the reach of some of 
the most important provisions in FECA to address constitutional 
vagueness concerns.  First, the definition of “political committee” 
(the trigger for contribution limitations and reporting 
requirements for political parties and organizations) was limited to 
those groups that not only passed the statutory threshold of making 
expenditures or receiving contributions of $1000 or more, but 
whose “major purpose” was “the nomination or election of a 
candidate.”33  In addition, Buckley limited the reach of the term 
 29. The FECA was substantially amended after the 1972 presidential election.  
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974).  It was these 1974 amendments that were 
challenged as unconstitutional in Buckley v. Valeo.  See generally Mark Alexander, 
Campaign Finance Reform: Central Meaning and New Approach, 60 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 767, 805 (2003); Hasen, supra note 233, at 887–89. 
 30. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2000) (prohibiting national banks from making 
contributions or expenditures in connection with any election to any political 
office); id. § 441c(a)(1) (prohibiting government contractors from making any 
contribution to any political party, committee, or candidate for public office or to 
any person for any political purpose or use); id. § 441e(a)(1) (prohibiting foreign 
nationals for making contributions in connection with any election to any political 
office).  The constitutionality of these sections were not challenged in Buckley v. 
Valeo.  See infra note 32. 
 31. 424 U.S. 1 (1976). 
 32. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 58–59 (upholding contribution limitations but striking 
down various expenditure limitations); Hasen, supra note 233, at 888. 
 33. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 79.  For further discussion of the “major purpose” test 
and how the definition of political committee continues to be a source of debate 
in campaign finance law circles, especially with the rise of “527 organizations” 
active in the 2000 and 2004 Presidential elections, see generally Lloyd H. Mayer, 
The Much Maligned 527 and Institutional Choice, 87 B.U. L. REV. 625 (2007) 
8
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“independent expenditure” to apply only to communications that 
“in express terms advocate the election or defeat” of a federal 
candidate.34  Communications that fell short of this “express 
advocacy” standard could not be subject to FECA’s reporting or 
funding requirements.35
Campaign finance reform advocates argued that the Buckley 
distinctions were stretched into massive loopholes by FEC 
regulations and lax enforcement in the 1990s, allowing more “soft 
money” into candidate campaigns and political parties.36  “Soft 
money” is the colloquial phrase referring to money that is not 
subject to FECA’s contribution limits, source prohibitions, and 
reporting requirements (compliant funds are referred to as “hard 
money”).37  Moreover, a dramatic increase in advertising from 
outside groups during the 1996 and 2000 elections that was 
targeted at candidates, yet did not qualify as express advocacy, 
increased the demand for additional reforms.38  The push for 
 
(describing the “problem” of 527 organizations and proposing various solutions 
under campaign finance and tax law). 
 34. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.  This holding, accompanied by a footnote listing 
particular words and phrases that would constitute such “express advocacy” such as 
“vote for” or “vote against,” is referred to as the “magic words” test.  Id. at n.52; see 
McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003).  The continued viability of this 
standard was questioned by McConnell v. FEC, in which the Court stated, “[i]ndeed, 
the unmistakable lesson from the record in this litigation, as all three judges on 
the District Court agreed, is that Buckley’s magic-words requirement is functionally 
meaningless.”  540 U.S. 93, 193 (2003).  See generally Richard L. Hasen, Buckley is 
Dead, Long Live Buckley: The New Campaign Finance Incoherence of McConnell v. 
Federal Election Commission, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 31 (2004) (examining 
McConnell’s impact on Buckley and as a part of a trend in new post-2000 campaign 
finance rulings of moving away from Buckley). 
 35. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 45. 
 36. See Craig Holman & Joan Claybrook, Outside Groups in the New Campaign 
Finance Environment: The Meaning of BCRA and the McConnell Decision, 22 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 235, 239–44 (2004).  With respect to reform organizations seeking 
change based on problems with the Buckley decision, see generally Roy A. Shotland, 
Act I: BCRA Wins in Congress.  Act II: BCRA Wins Big at the Court.  Act III: BCRA Loses 
to Reality, 3 ELECTION L.J. 335 (2004).  Complaints about the FEC’s enforcement 
of FECA were ubiquitous before BCRA’s passage.  See, e.g., Kenneth A. Gross, The 
Enforcement of Campaign Finance Rules: A System in Search of Reform, 9 YALE L. & 
POL’Y REV. 279 (1991); Amanda S. La Forge, The Toothless Tiger—Structural, Political 
and Legal Barriers to Effective FEC Enforcement: An Overview and Recommendations, 10 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 351 (1996). 
 37. The official terms in the FEC’s regulations are “federal” and “Non-
federal” funds.  See 11 C.F.R. § 300.2(g), (k) (2007). 
 38. See Spencer Overton, Restraint and Responsibility: Judicial Review of Campaign 
Reform, 61 WASH & LEE L. REV. 663, 670–71 (2004) (discussing rise in “issue 
advocacy” not regulated by FECA); Daniel H. Lowenstein, BCRA and McConnell in 
9
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reform eventually resulted in passage of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA).39
BCRA drastically expanded the reach of federal campaign 
finance law related to raising and spending money by federal 
candidates and political parties.  For the first time, the law reached 
out to regulate some activity by state and local parties, as well as 
activity by federal candidates in connection with state and local 
elections.  Three main objectives of BCRA were to (1) eliminate 
soft money from federal elections, (2) restrict “electioneering 
communications,” (i.e. advertising from outside sources using soft 
money that referred to a federal candidate in the final days leading 
up to an election), and (3) limit the ability of state and local parties 
or candidates to become alternative outlets for soft money to fund 
certain “federal election activities” (FEA).40  Many doubted the 
constitutionality of this expansion of the law, and a coalition of 
members of Congress and outside organizations challenged the law 
immediately under the expedited procedures provided in the law.41
In McConnell v. FEC42 the Supreme Court upheld the vast 
majority of the new provisions in BCRA, including the ban on 
raising or spending soft money by national political parties and 
federal candidates.43  Justice Kennedy’s concurrence noted one 
consequence of BCRA and McConnell on future ballot measure 
campaigns, stating “Title I bars national party officials from 
soliciting or directing soft money to state parties for use on a state 
 
Perspective, 3 ELECTION L.J. 277, 278–79 (2004) (same). 
 39. Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 
81 (2002). 
 40. Another major revision in BCRA, increasing the individual contribution 
limits for the first time since 1974 and indexing those limits for inflation, is not 
discussed here as it is not relevant to ballot measure campaigns.  See Richard L. 
Pildes, The Constitutionalization of Democratic Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 28, 131–32 
(2004) (noting BCRA’s main features as removing soft money from various levels 
of political parties, restricting issue ads, and increasing individual contribution 
limits); Lowenstein, supra note 38, at 279 (same). 
 41. See McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003).  
 42. Id.  This article only briefly discusses the McConnell case for the particular 
portions of BCRA that are implicated later in the discussion of federal campaign 
finance restrictions on ballot measure campaigns.  For more thorough analysis of 
the McConnell decision, see, e.g., Hasen, supra note 34; Pildes, supra note 400; 
Overton, supra note  38; Lowenstein, supra note 38. 
 43. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 161 (upholding restriction on national parties); id. 
at 184 (upholding restrictions on federal candidates). 
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ballot initiative.  This is true even if no federal office appears on 
the same ballot as the state initiative.”44
Justice Kennedy is correct that BCRA’s restriction on national 
parties (and likewise on federal candidates or officeholders) to 
raise or spend soft money does not appear to depend upon a 
federal candidate appearing on the same ballot as a non-federal 
candidate or state ballot measure.45  But the majority opinion 
correctly notes that this restriction does not bar all strategy 
planning between national party officials and state parties or 
candidates about ballot measures; rather, it only bars direct 
solicitation or spending of soft money by national parties.46  As 
discussed below, the exact application of these fundraising 
restrictions to state ballot measures remains somewhat unsettled. 
The McConnell Court also upheld the new “electioneering 
communications” funding restrictions and reporting requirements 
as facially constitutional.47  The Court held that BCRA could 
regulate advertisements that do not constitute express advocacy for 
or against federal candidates because “[t]he justifications for the 
regulation of express advocacy apply equally to ads aired during 
those periods if the ads are intended to influence the voters’ 
decisions and have that effect.”48  The definition of “electioneering 
communications” was not unconstitutionally vague, according to 
the McConnell Court, and therefore did not require the statutory 
construction used in Buckley to limit independent expenditures to 
express advocacy.49  Thus, these BCRA provisions could reach any 
broadcast communication, including advertisements supporting or 
opposing state ballot measures that mentioned a federal candidate 
within thirty to sixty days of a federal election to the appropriately 
targeted audience. 
In addition, the Court upheld the new limitations on FEA 
conducted by state and local parties.50  The Court held that 
Congress had the authority to regulate some aspects of state and 
 44. Id. at 289 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 45. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(a)(1), (e)(1)(B) (2000). 
 46. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 160. 
 47. Id. at 201 (upholding electioneering communications disclosure 
provisions); id. at 209 (upholding electioneering communications funding 
restrictions). 
 48. Id. at 206. 
 49. Id. at 193–94.  The definition of electioneering communication is 
discussed further in the next section. 
 50. Id. at 173. 
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local party activity, noting: 
In constructing a coherent scheme of campaign finance 
regulation, Congress recognized that, given the close ties 
between federal candidates and state party committees, 
BCRA’s restrictions on national committee activity would 
rapidly become ineffective if state and local committees 
remained available as a conduit for soft-money 
donations.51
The Court held that “[p]reventing corrupting activity from 
shifting wholesale to state committees and thereby eviscerating 
FECA clearly qualifies as an important governmental interest.”52  
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that BCRA’s provisions 
were “a new brand of pervasive federal regulation of state-focused 
electioneering activities that cannot possibly corrupt or appear to 
corrupt federal officeholders and thus goes well beyond Congress’s 
concerns about the corruption of the federal electoral process.”53  
Instead, these restrictions on state and local party activity were 
upheld as narrowly tailored to further an important governmental 
interest.54  The new era of federal campaign finance law reaching 
out to regulate parts of state and local elections had arrived. 
III. BCRA’S EFFECTS ON STATE BALLOT MEASURE CAMPAIGNS 
FECA, as amended by BCRA, does not mention state ballot 
initiatives or referenda, and the almost 400 pages of FEC 
regulations only mention ballot measures once, in an expired 
provision.55  Before BCRA, a series of FEC advisory opinions 
exempted from campaign finance regulation most contributions or 
expenditures exclusively related to ballot measures (as opposed to 
state or federal candidate elections), based on both the statutory 
 51. Id. at 161. 
 52. Id. at 165–66. 
 53. Id. at 166.  As noted in Hasen’s analysis of McConnell, the record of 
possible circumvention through local parties was sparse as compared to the 
evidence that the FEA restrictions would interfere with plenty of local activity.  See 
Hasen, supra note 34, at 49.  See also Lowenstein, supra note 38, at 280–82 (arguing 
BCRA improperly federalizes state and local activity in these provisions). 
 54. McConnell, 540 U.S. at 173. 
 55. See 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(1)(iii)(A)(2) (2007).  This provision expired on 
its sunset date of September 1, 2007.  Id. § 100.24(a)(1)(iii)(B).  However, as 
discussed below, the FEC has issued a proposed rule to make this provision 
permanent.  See Federal Election Activity and Non-Federal Elections, 72 Fed. Reg. 
31473 (proposed June 7, 2007). 
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language and First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti.56  But analysis of 
the FEC’s post-BCRA advisory opinions and rulemaking reveals that 
all three areas of BCRA’s expanded regulation (restricting federal 
candidates’ involvement with soft money, restrictions on 
“electioneering communications,” and restrictions on FEA by state 
and local parties) have a real impact on state ballot measure 
campaigns.  First, the new restrictions on raising and spending 
nonfederal funds in 2 U.S.C. section 441i(e) affect the ability of 
federal candidates and officeholders to donate and raise money for 
ballot initiative committees, and the extent to which these 
candidates and officeholders can be involved in endorsing or 
opposing certain ballot measures in their states.  Second, the 
“electioneering communications” provisions require disclosure of a 
ballot measure committee’s donors to the FEC and can also restrict 
advertising for ballot initiatives by committees that are 
incorporated or that accept corporate donations.  Finally, the FEA 
provisions can restrict how state and local political parties fund 
certain voter mobilization and public communications in 
connection with ballot measure campaigns.  Although it is clear 
that these provisions all affect ballot measure campaigns, the 
precise contours of the law are somewhat unclear due to recent 
court decisions and imminent changes in the composition of the 
FEC.  This section will further discuss the rules in each of these 
areas and explain how ballot initiative and referenda campaigns are 
implicated. 
A. Restrictions on Federal Candidates and Officeholders 
Recent social science analysis has discussed how modern 
candidates use ballot initiatives as proxy elections for issues and as a 
catalyst for voter turnout.57  Ballot measures can be a useful 
 56. See, e.g., Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 1989-32 (July 2, 1990), available at 
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/890032.html (noting foreign national contribution 
prohibition is only applicable to candidate elections); Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 
1980-95 (Sept. 19, 1980), available at http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/800095.html 
(interpreting national bank contribution prohibition as applicable only to 
candidate elections and citing Bellotti).  BCRA actually amended the foreign 
national prohibition in 2 U.S.C. § 441e(a)(1)(A) (2000), so that the prohibition 
now applies to any “federal, state or local election,” removing the reference to 
“political office,” which formed the basis for the FEC’s interpretation in Advisory 
Opinion 1989-32.  Pub. L. No. 107-155, tit. III. § 303, 116 Stat. 96, 109 (2002) 
(amending 2 U.S.C. § 441e (2000)). 
 57. See, e.g., Elizabeth Garrett, Hybrid Democracy, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1096, 
1098–1105 (2005) (discussing the use of ballot initiatives by candidates to 
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strategic tool for federal candidates, as well as for others who wish 
to influence federal candidate elections.  Before BCRA there were 
few, if any, federal law restrictions on a federal candidate or 
officeholder’s involvement with a ballot initiative campaign.58
After BCRA, section 441i(e) restricts raising or spending 
nonfederal funds by federal candidates, including money raised or 
spent in state or local elections and money spent by nonprofit 
organizations.59  First, section 441i(e)(1)(B) provides that federal 
candidates may only “solicit, receive, direct, transfer, or spend 
funds in connection with any election other than an election for 
Federal office” if the money complies with the contribution 
amount limitations and source prohibitions in FECA.  Second, 
section 441i(e)(4) allows federal candidates to make general 
solicitations for unlimited donations to nonprofit organizations 
organized under section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code,60 
but only if that organization does not have a principal purpose of 
conducting certain voter mobilization activities.61  If the nonprofit 
organization’s principal purpose is to conduct such activities, the 
federal candidate is limited to making specific solicitations for 
donations from individuals in amounts not to exceed $20,000 per 
year.62  These provisions extend beyond restricting the activities of 
federal candidates because they apply equally to federal 
officeholders who are not running for re-election, as well as to any 
“entity directly or indirectly established, financed, maintained or 
controlled” (“EFMC’d”) by a federal candidate or officeholder.63
 
influence partisan voter turnout and strengthen interest groups).  The current 
analysis and data regarding the interaction between candidate and ballot measure 
campaigns shows how far this practice has evolved since the days of Bellotti.  See, 
e.g., Richard Briffault, Ballot Propositions and Campaign Finance Reform, 1996 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 413 (1996) (discussing how separate ballot measure campaigns were 
from candidate campaigns so that there was no corruption rationale to support 
campaign finance regulation of ballot measure campaigns). 
 58. One possible issue that might have surfaced pre-BCRA would be whether 
a federal candidate could donate campaign funds to a ballot initiative committee.  
See 2 U.S.C. § 439a (Supp. 2004) (listing permitted uses for campaign funds and 
prohibiting use of campaign funds for personal use). 
 59. See id. § 441i(e)(1)(B) (restricting solicitations and spending in non-
federal elections); id. § 441i(e)(4) (restricting solicitations for nonprofit 
organizations).  See also 11 C.F.R. § 300.62 (2007) (non-federal elections); id. § 
300.65 (nonprofit organizations). 
 60. I.R.C. § 501(c) (Supp. 2004). 
 61. Specifically, Type I and II FEA as described infra section C.  See 2 U.S.C. § 
441i(e)(4)(A) (2000). 
 62. See id. § 441i(e)(4)(B). 
 63. Id. § 441i(e)(1). 
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A series of FEC advisory opinions have addressed how section 
441i(e) affects federal candidate involvement in ballot initiatives 
campaigns.  Advisory opinions do not have binding precedential 
effect at the FEC, and each one is expressly limited to the facts 
presented in the request.64  But the Commissioners tend to defer to 
prior advisory opinions’ interpretation of a statutory or regulatory 
provision in order to provide some consistency and predictability 
for those who are interpreting the law and applying it to their 
campaign activities.  Since BCRA became effective, the FEC has 
issued four advisory opinions squarely addressing various 
applications of the new fundraising restrictions to ballot measure 
elections, but these opinions do not present consistent 
interpretations of the law.  Because no clear FEC consensus 
rationale has emerged on these issues, these prior interpretations 
are subject to change as the Commissioners’ terms expire and are 
replaced with new Presidential appointees who might not share the 
same views as prior Commissioners.  The most recent advisory 
opinion regarding a ballot measure committee was issued in early 
2006, and the changing composition of the FEC may affect the 
outcome of advisory opinion requests regarding ballot measure 
committees in the 2008 election.65
1. Federal Candidate-Controlled Ballot Measure Committees 
As discussed above, the restrictions in section 441i(e) apply 
specifically to any organization that is EFMC’d by a federal 
candidate or officeholder.  Ballot measure committees are 
sometimes considered candidate-controlled, although they are 
usually tied to state or local candidates.66  Two different advisory 
opinions discuss the issue of a ballot measure committee EFMC’d 
 64. 11 C.F.R. § 112.5(a) (2007). 
 65. At present, the FEC has one vacant Republican seat, two Republicans on 
recess appointments, one Democrat on “holdover” status awaiting nomination of a 
replacement, and two Democrats on recess appointments.  See Kenneth Doyle, Fate 
of FEC Nominees Still Unclear as Senate Committee Schedules Vote, MONEY & POL. REP. 
(BNA), Sept. 25, 2007, at 1.  These recess appointments are set to expire if the 
Senate does not confirm the nominations before the Senate ends its session in 
December 2007.  Id. 
 66. See generally Hank Dempsey, The “Overlooked Hermaphrodite” of Campaign 
Finance: Candidate-Controlled Ballot Measure Committees in California Politics, 95 CAL. L. 
REV. 123 (2007) (arguing that present-day reality of candidate-controlled 
committees makes the City of Berkeley rationale for limiting campaign finance 
regulation of ballot measure campaigns obsolete); Garrett, supra note 57 
(describing candidate-controlled ballot measure committees in California). 
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by a federal candidate. 
The first advisory opinion to analyze BCRA’s effects on federal 
candidate involvement with ballot measure committees was advisory 
opinion 2003-12 (Flake). 67  While a candidate for re-election, U.S. 
Representative Jeff Flake was working with a ballot measure 
committee called “Stop Taxpayer Money for Politicians 
Committee” (“STMP”) to qualify a particular ballot measure for 
public vote in the November 2004 Arizona general election.68  This 
advisory opinion makes a number of distinctions between types of 
ballot measure committees and different phases of a ballot measure 
campaign that affect how FECA applies.  The FEC’s general 
conclusion was that all activities of a ballot measure committee that 
is EFMC’d by a federal candidate are “in connection with any 
election other than an election for federal office” and, therefore, 
governed by the amount limitations and source prohibitions during 
the entire life of the ballot measure campaign.69  The FEC then 
stated that STMP qualified as a committee “established” by 
Representative Flake because, inter alia, as one of the founding 
individuals for the ballot measure committee, he signed the papers 
with the state creating STMP, he served as STMP’s first Chairman, 
and one of his campaign consultants was the aid that helped STMP 
with its state filings and opening its first bank account.70
Once the ballot measure committee was found to be EFMC’d 
by a federal candidate, a number of restrictions attached.  Most 
importantly, STMP was limited to raising a total of $5000 per 
calendar year from any donor, and could not raise money from 
prohibited sources under FECA (such as corporations and labor 
organizations), even if state law allowed higher contribution 
amounts or contributions from these sources.71  Thus, although 
Representative Flake could serve as STMP’s Chair and his 
 67. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n. 2003-12 (July 29, 2003), available at 
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/030012.html. 
 68. Id. at 1–2. 
 69. Id. at 6.  In order to determine if a ballot measure committee is EFMC’d 
by a federal candidate or officeholder, the FEC applies ten “affiliation factors” that 
look at the overall relationship between the individual and the committee.  Id. at 
7.  11 C.F.R. section 100.5(g)(4) (2007) lists the affiliation factors such as whether 
the individual has authority to direct or participate in the governance of the 
committee, or whether the individual had an active or significant role in the 
formation of the committee.  See also id. § 110.3(a)(3). 
 70. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2003-12, at 7 (July 29, 2003), available at 
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/030012.html. 
 71. Id. at 8. 
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campaign employees could be involved in directing STMP’s 
activities, all fundraising by Representative Flake or STMP was 
limited to these restrictions.72  Basically, because Representative 
Flake established STMP, that state ballot measure committee was 
treated as a federal political committee and was required to comply 
with all amount limitations, source prohibitions, and reporting 
obligations in FECA. 
In contrast to the limitations placed on STMP, the advisory 
opinion explained that ballot measure committees that are not 
EFMC’d by a federal candidate or officeholder are not restricted by 
section 441i(e)(1)(B) before the committee actually qualifies an 
initiative or referendum for the ballot.73  The FEC noted that 
“merely encouraging voters to sign a petition” does not trigger 
these restrictions and a federal candidate or officeholder may freely 
encourage voters to sign petitions.74  Commissioner Mason 
dissented from this advisory opinion, but agreed with the 
interpretation that the initial phase of qualifying a measure for the 
ballot did not trigger FECA, while the later phase of a campaign 
where voters are encouraged to vote for or against a ballot measure 
could be considered “in connection with an election.”75  But he 
disagreed with the interpretation that STMP, as a committee 
EFMC’d by a federal candidate, was still subject to FECA’s 
restrictions even in the first qualifying phase.76
In advisory opinion 2006-04 (Tancredo), the FEC again 
applied the EFMC’d analysis, this time focusing on a situation 
where a federal candidate “financed” a ballot measure committee.77  
In his advisory opinion request, U.S. Representative Thomas 
Tancredo presented different options for various donations to be 
made from his campaign committee to a state ballot measure 
committee (Defend Colorado Now or “DCN”).  He also asked 
questions about permissible endorsements and other interactions 
with the committee.78  The FEC concluded that Representative 
 72. Id. at 10–11.  The advisory opinion also notes that any voter registration 
activity that STMP conducted might have to be reported as FEA expenses.  Id.  See 
section C below for further discussion of the FEA requirements. 
 73. Id. at 6; see 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(1)(B) (2007). 
 74. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2003-12, at 10 (July 29, 2003), available at 
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/030012.html. 
 75. Id. at 2 (dissenting opinion). 
 76. Id. at 3. 
 77. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2006-04, at 1–2 (Mar. 31, 2006), available at 
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/060004.html. 
 78. Id. at 1–2. 
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Tancredo may donate campaign funds to DCN, but that the 
amounts proposed would constitute “financing” because the 
amounts proposed constituted providing funds “in a significant 
amount” under the FEC’s affiliation factors.79  The advisory opinion 
explains that Representative Tancredo’s first proposed alternative 
of donating the lesser of $50,000 or 50% of DCN’s total donations 
would be a “significant amount” and would result in DCN being 
considered EFMC’d by the federal candidate under FEC 
regulations.80  The second proposed alternative of donating the 
lesser of $50,000 or 25% of DCN’s total donations required the 
FEC to look at the “context of the overall relationship” between 
Representative Tancredo and DCN to determine whether it would 
trigger EFMC’d status.81  Here, the FEC looked to facts similar to 
the Flake advisory opinion: Representative Tancredo would share 
polling data and strategy with DCN, he would use his own 
campaign funds to run advertisements supporting the initiative, he 
supported identical initiatives in the past, and he was closely 
identified with the issue.82  Based on the aforementioned facts, 
together with a determination that such a donation would be 
“substantial seed money” for DCN, the FEC determined that such a 
donation would result in Representative Tancredo “financing” 
DCN.83
The Tancredo advisory opinion confirmed that federal 
candidates may use their own campaign funds to pay for 
advertisements endorsing a ballot initiative regarding an issue with 
which the candidate is associated.84  The FEC also concluded that 
Representative Tancredo can accept polling data from DCN; 
however, this may result in an in-kind contribution subject to 
FECA’s amount limitations and source prohibitions.85
 79. Id. at 2–3.  Chairman Toner and Commissioner von Spakovsky dissented 
and wrote separately to emphasize their view that an EFMC analysis should be a 
totality of the circumstances approach looking at all ten affiliation factors and 
disagreeing with the conclusion in this advisory opinion that DCN would be 
considered EFMC’d by Representative Tancredo.  See id. (dissenting opinion). 
 80. Id. at 4. 
 81. Id. at 5. 
 82. Id.   
 83. Id.  Tancredo’s third proposal was to pay signature-gathering vendors on 
behalf of DCN instead of donating money directly to the committee.  The FEC 
noted that the legal effect was the same as if the money went directly to the 
committee, and therefore the analysis would not change.  Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 6 (citing FEC’s polling data regulations at 11 C.F.R. § 106.4 (2007)). 
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The Tancredo advisory opinion should serve as a warning to 
ballot committees that want to take donations from federal 
candidates or officeholders (which is generally permissible).  
Accepting too much seed money from an individual governed by 
section 441i(e) could result in the ballot measure committee being 
considered as EFMC’d by that individual, especially if the ballot 
measure committee is also coordinating strategy or advertising with 
that individual.  Once that threshold is crossed, the ballot measure 
committee could be subject to a host of FECA reporting 
requirements and funding restrictions. 
Moving forward into the 2008 election, it is unclear whether 
the broad conclusion of the Flake advisory opinion (that any ballot 
measure committee EFMC’d by a federal candidate is subject to all 
restrictions of FECA throughout the campaign) would still be 
applied by the FEC.  In a concurrence to advisory opinion 2005-10 
(Berman-Doolittle), two Commissioners partially repudiated their 
votes on the Flake advisory opinion, stating “[w]hile we continue to 
believe that the result in 2003-12 was substantially correct, we 
believe that the reasoning was faulty.”86  Instead of relying on 
section 441i(e)(1)(B) regarding non-federal elections, these 
Commissioners stated the better analysis was when a federal 
candidate EFMC’s a ballot measure committee, and the issue is one 
with which the candidate is closely identified, and the committee 
spends soft money to influence voting for that ballot measure on 
the same day that the candidate is on the ballot, then the 
committee’s actions are actually governed by section 441i(e)(1) as 
in connection with a federal election, i.e., that federal candidate’s 
own election.87  This approach appears to be a narrower 
interpretation of the statutory restrictions in many ways.  First, this 
analysis would not apply when a federal officeholder (generally 
subject to the restrictions of section 441i(e)) EFMC’s a ballot 
measure committee when the officeholder is not running for re-
election.  Likewise, it would seem to allow a federal candidate who 
is not on the same ballot as the ballot measure, to EFMC a ballot 
measure committee without triggering FECA.  Since these 
 86. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2005-10, at 2 (Aug. 22, 2005) (concurring 
opinion), available at http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/050010.html.  However, 
Commissioner Weintraub did not write any separate concurrence to the Tancredo 
advisory opinion elaborating on this position.  (Commissioner McDonald’s term 
expired and he left the Commission at the end of 2005). 
 87. Id. 
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situations have not yet been presented to the FEC, a definitive 
answer would require a new advisory opinion request or perhaps a 
rulemaking on this subject that would provide regulations of 
general application.  In the interim, ballot measure committees 
should be cautious when involving a federal candidate in 
establishing or financing the committee in order to avoid the 
restrictions imposed by federal political committee status. 
2. Ballot Measure Committees Independent of a Federal Candidate 
Two other advisory opinions have examined what is 
permissible under BCRA when a federal candidate or officeholder 
wants to become involved with a ballot measure committee that is 
independent (i.e., not EFMC’d by the candidate or officeholder).  
In this circumstance, the BCRA restrictions still apply to the federal 
candidate, but do not necessarily attach to the activities of the 
ballot measure committee itself as described in the Flake advisory 
opinion.  But the most recent advisory opinions indicate that the 
restrictions on the federal candidate or officeholder depend upon 
whether or not that candidate is participating in the same election 
as the ballot measure and whether the ballot measure committee is 
organized as a particular type of nonprofit corporation under the 
IRS tax code.   
In advisory opinion 2004-29 (Akin), U.S. Representative Todd 
Akin asked a series of questions about donations, fundraising, and 
advertising for two ballot measure committees in his state of 
Missouri.88  The FEC concluded that Representative Akin could 
donate campaign funds to the ballot measure committees and 
could also solicit hard money contributions to his campaign for the 
express purpose of passing those funds on to the ballot measure 
committees.89  Consistent with other advisory opinions, the FEC 
also concluded that Representative Akin could appear in, and use 
his own campaign funds to pay for advertisements run both inside 
and outside his district that supported or opposed ballot 
measures.90
The more complex question in the Akin advisory opinion was 
whether Akin could appear in advertisements that supported or 
opposed ballot measures if the ballot measure committee or 
 88. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2004-29 (Sept. 30, 2004), available at 
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/040029.html. 
 89. Id. at 2–3. 
 90. Id. at 7–8. 
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another independent organization paid for those advertisements 
instead of his campaign.  The FEC applied its post-BCRA 
regulations, stating that any “coordinated communication” between 
a candidate and an outside organization is an in-kind contribution 
to the candidate.91  In that case, such advertising would be 
considered coordinated because: (1) the advertisements would be 
paid for by the ballot measure committee; (2) Representative Akin 
would be “materially involved” in the creation of the 
advertisements because he would approve the content and 
personally appear in the advertisements; and (3) the 
advertisements would refer to a federal candidate within 120 days 
of the general election and be directed to voters in that district.92  
Because the advertisements would be considered coordinated, the 
ballot measure committee could not pay for the advertisement if 
that cost would exceed the contribution limit to federal candidates 
or if the ballot measure committee was using money from 
prohibited sources, such as corporations or labor organizations.93
To apply the Akin advisory opinion to the 2008 election cycle, 
independent ballot measure committees may accept donations of 
campaign funds from federal candidates or officeholders, even if 
those candidates appear on the same ballot as the initiative or 
referendum.  Federal candidates and officeholders may also 
specifically raise money for their campaign accounts and tell 
donors that the money will be transferred to an independent ballot 
measure committee.94  Finally, although ballot measure committees 
 91. Id. at 3–7 (citing and discussing the coordination test in 11 C.F.R. § 
109.21 (2007)). 
 92. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2004-29, at 3–7.  The timeframes for this last 
part of the coordination test in 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(4) have since been revised by 
the FEC to vary based on the type of candidate referenced, but these changes are 
subject to ongoing litigation.  See Shays v. FEC, No. 06-1247, 2007 WL 2616689 
(D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2007) (memorandum opinion). 
 93. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2004-29, at 6–7.  The FEC suggested that 
Representative Akin’s campaign reimburse the ballot measure committee for a 
portion of the costs of the ads to avoid any excessive or prohibited contributions.  
Id. at 7. 
 94. The analysis of permissible use of campaign funds in the Flake and Akin 
advisory opinions is somewhat outdated now since the rules on permissible use 
have changed to include “any other lawful purpose” in 2 U.S.C. § 439a(a) (2000 & 
Supp. 2005) and 11 C.F.R. § 113.2(e) (2007).  See Final Rules on Use of Campaign 
Funds for Donations to Non-Federal Candidates and Any Other Lawful Purpose Other than 
Personal Use, 72 Fed. Reg. 56,245, (Oct. 3, 2007), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/fedrgstr/EPAFR-CONTENTS/2007/October/Day03/ 
contents.htm.  Thus, federal candidates need no longer show that the particular 
issue of the ballot measure is something that they are closely identified with in 
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may work with federal candidates and officeholders to prepare 
advertisements that feature endorsements or statements of 
opposition to particular ballot measures by the candidate, they 
must be aware of the coordinated communications rules.  Within 
certain windows of time (ninety days before an election for a 
congressional candidate and 120 days before the primary election 
through the general election for a Presidential candidate),95 
advertisements targeted within that candidate’s district could be 
considered an in-kind contribution to that candidate.  If the ballot 
measure committee is incorporated (even as a nonprofit), any such 
contribution is prohibited under FECA and the ballot measure 
committee would be exposed to liability for making an illegal 
contribution.96  If the ballot measure committee is not 
incorporated, then the amount limitations apply to any in-kind 
contribution to the candidate (which at just over $2000 can be 
easily exceeded by paying the costs of an advertisement).97  In 2006, 
the FEC specifically declined to create a “safe harbor” exception to 
the coordinated communication rules for advertisements where a 
federal candidate is endorsing or opposing a ballot measure.98  
Therefore, ballot measure campaigns need to be wary of these 
coordination rules and take appropriate steps to avoid a FECA 
violation when creating advertisements with a federal candidate. 
The most recent advisory opinion, 2005-10 (Berman-
Doolittle), also involved activities by federal candidates in support 
of an independent ballot measure committee, but presented a 
situation where the ballot measure was not on the ballot in the same 
election as the federal candidates.99  This advisory opinion request 
from U.S. Representatives Howard Berman and John Doolittle 
asked what fundraising was permissible for these federal candidates 
in support of various ballot measures to be voted on in a special 
California statewide election in November 2005.  Representatives 
Berman and Doolittle wanted to fundraise for independent ballot 
 
order to allow donations of campaign funds. 
 95. See 11 C.F.R. § 109.21(c)(4)(i)–(ii) (2007).  There are also different rules 
regarding time periods for ads that mention a political party together with the 
candidate reference.  Id. § 109.21(c)(4)(iv). 
 96. See 2 U.S.C. § 441b (2000); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2(b)(1) (prohibiting 
corporations from making contributions). 
 97. 11 C.F.R. § 110.1(b)(1). 
 98. Coordinated Communications, 71 Fed. Reg. 33,190, 33,202 (June 8, 2006) 
(to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 109). 
 99. Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2005-10 (Aug. 22, 2005), available at 
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/050010.html. 
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measure committees, but would not raise money for any 
communications that would refer to either of them and that would 
be distributed in their districts.100  The FEC’s conclusion states the 
rules in section 441i(e)(1) regarding fundraising restrictions on 
federal candidates in federal and non-federal elections and then 
states that these restrictions “do not apply to the fundraising 
activities” described in the request without further explanation.101
Advisory opinion 2005-10 is an example of an advisory opinion 
where a majority of four Commissioners agreed on the result, but 
not the legal reasoning behind it.  In advisory opinion 2005-10, 
there are three separate Commissioner statements: a dissent and 
two different concurrences with different legal analyses.102  
Commissioner Thomas argued in a lengthy dissent that both the 
statutory language and past advisory opinions clearly indicate that a 
ballot measure election falls within section 441i(e)(1)(B)’s 
restrictions on fundraising in connection with “any election other 
than an election for federal office.”103  Thus, his interpretation 
supported the two-phase approach in the Flake advisory opinion, 
that once a ballot measure committee succeeds in qualifying the 
measure for the ballot, the subsequent phase of campaign activity 
leading up to the election should be considered governed by 
section 441i(e)(1)(B), and federal candidates and officeholders 
would only be allowed to raise amounts consistent with FECA’s 
limitations and source prohibitions for those ballot measure 
committees.104
Commissioners Weintraub and McDonald attempted to square 
the conclusions in this advisory opinion with the prior Flake 
advisory opinion by reinterpreting the reasoning behind Flake (as 
discussed above) and by generally characterizing ballot measure 
advocacy as “issue-driven” instead of “candidate-driven.”105  Thus, 
these Commissioners argue that the potential for corruption is 
lower and that a federal candidate’s involvement in ballot measure 
campaigns is not per se restricted by BCRA.106  Instead of a bright-
line rule that ballot measure elections are always covered by section 
441i(e)(1)(B) (as argued by Commissioner Thomas), or are never 
 100. Id. at 2. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 1–3 (dissenting opinion). 
 104. Id. at 3. 
 105. Id. at 1 (concurring opinion). 
 106. Id. 
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covered by section 441(e)(1)(B) (as argued by Commissioners 
Mason and Toner), these Commissioners attempted to create a 
compromised analysis that looks at the particular circumstances 
surrounding the ballot measure election to determine if 
restrictions are needed to prevent the risk of corruption.107  
Accordingly, if a federal candidate EFMC’d a ballot measure 
committee for an initiative on the same ballot on which he is 
running for re-election (e.g., the Flake advisory opinion), then 
BCRA can appropriately restrict those activities.  In contrast, where 
no federal candidate is on the same ballot as the initiative and the 
ballot measure committee is not EFMC’d by a federal candidate 
(e.g., the Berman-Doolittle advisory opinion) there is no such risk, 
and BCRA restrictions do not apply.108  These Commissioners also 
note that the exemption for certain solicitations for 501(c) 
nonprofit corporations would allow a federal candidate or 
officeholder to raise unlimited funds for a ballot measure 
committee organized under that section regardless of whether or 
not federal candidates are also on the ballot.109
The disparate views of the Commissioners about how the 
BCRA restrictions applied in this case illustrate why there are no 
easy answers for federal candidates and ballot measure committees 
who want to work together on state ballot measure campaigns.  
Although there is no controlling rationale from the four 
Commissioners, federal candidates may cautiously rely on advisory 
opinion 2005-10 to support participation in activities that raise 
unlimited funds for an independent ballot measure committee for 
an initiative or referendum voted on during an election in which 
there are no federal candidates on the ballot.110  There is also some 
indication in advisory opinion 2005-10 that a ballot measure 
campaign may reduce the restrictions on federal candidate 
fundraising by incorporating as a 501(c) nonprofit organization.111  
But there are still limits on fundraising for 501(c) organizations 
 107. See id. 
 108. Id. at 3. 
 109. Id. (citing 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(4) (2002)). 
 110. Op. Fed Fed. Election Comm’n 2005-10, at 10 (Aug. 22, 2005), available at 
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/050010.html (concurring opinion) (“At the very 
least, Section 441i(e)’s fundraising restrictions do not apply to referenda and 
initiatives where, as here, no federal candidate appears on the ballot along with 
the referendum or initiative, and no ballot measure organization is established, 
financed, maintained or controlled by any federal candidate.”). 
 111. Id. at 6 (dissenting opinion) (expressing uncertainty about the 
applicability of restrictions in 501(c) groups). 
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that conduct FEA (which may reach many common ballot measure 
campaign activities as described below).  Moreover, incorporating 
as a 501(c) nonprofit would also increase the potential for 
advertisements that include federal candidate endorsements 
running afoul of the electioneering communications and 
coordinated communications regulations which are both subject to 
the corporate funding prohibition.  So again, there are no clear 
options for ballot measure committees seeking to avoid BCRA 
restrictions on their activities other than perhaps rejecting any 
offer of fundraising or endorsements from federal candidates or 
officeholders (which would seem to be very helpful for achieving 
their ultimate goal). 
Unfortunately, most of these questions were not answered in 
the FEC's response to a 2007 advisory opinion request seeking 
more definitive guidance on how Federal candidates can raise 
money for ballot measure committees.112  In this request, current 
U.S. Representatives Kevin McCarthy and Devin Nunes of 
California specifically asked whether they may “freely raise funds” 
for independent ballot measure committees supporting a state 
ballot initiative regarding redistricting.113 In contrast to the Berman-
Doolittle advisory opinion, this request states that the ballot 
initiative will be on the same ballot as both U.S. Representatives 
seeking re-election (either the 2008 primary or general election).114 
 The request also breaks this question into two parts, asking 
separately about raising money in the pre-qualification phase and 
the post-qualification phase of the campaign.115  This request also 
specifies that the ballot measure committee is a 501(c) nonprofit 
organization and cites the regulations governing federal candidate 
solicitations for such organizations.116  Finally, the request stipulates 
that any money raised by the candidates will not be used for public 
communications referring to either of them.117    
Only two of the Commissioners who voted on advisory opinion 
2005-10 considered this 2007 advisory opinion request 
(Commissioners Mason and Weintraub).  Nonetheless, the result 
was similar to the Berman-Doolittle opinion: the FEC issued a brief 
    112.    See Advisory Opinion 2007-28, available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/ 
searchao?SUBMIT=continue. 
    113.    Id. at 1.  
    114.    Id. at 1-2.   
    115.    Id. at 2. 
    116.    Id. 
    117.    Id. 
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answer with no controlling rationale.  After citing the general rules 
restricting solicitations by Federal candidates and officeholders in 
section 441i(e), the advisory opinion states:  
The Commission concludes that Representatives 
McCarthy and Nunes may solicit up to $20,000 during any 
calendar year from individuals on behalf of PAIC or other 
similar ballot initiative committees not directly or 
indirectly established, financed, maintained, or controlled 
by, or acting on behalf of, either officeholder. The 
Commission is unable to agree on a single rationale. 
Further explanation is provided in the Commissioners' 
concurring opinions.118  
At this time, all concurring opinions have not been released, 
but the one page concurring opinion by the two Republican 
Commissioners, Vice Chairman Mason and Commissioner von 
Spakovsky provides some insight.119  That concurrence explains that 
the $20,000 from individuals limit on the amount of funds that the 
requesting Federal candidates can raise for the ballot committee 
was derived from the section 441i(e)(4)(B) exception to the 
fundraising restrictions for specific solicitations to nonprofit 
organizations organized under 501(c) of the tax code.120  Mason 
and von Spakovsky, consistent with statements in prior advisory 
opinions, instead conclude that the restrictions of section 441i(e) 
do not apply at all and would vote to approve the unrestricted 
solicitation of funds by Federal candidates for ballot measure 
committees in these circumstances.121  When the Democratic 
concurring opinion is released, it will be interesting to see how 
Commissioner Weintraub applies her Berman-Doolittle approach 
to the situation where the federal candidates seeking to raise 
money for the ballot measure committee are themselves on the 
same ballot as the supported initiative.  Evidently, the tax status of 
the ballot measure committee is a salient fact in this analysis if the 
answer depends upon whether or not that exception in section 
441i(e)(4) is triggered.  Without a consensus rationale approved by 
the FEC, this advisory opinion does not confirm the continued 
    118.    See id. at 3.  
    119.  See Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2007-28 (Dec. 18, 2007) (concurring 
opinion), available at http://saos.nictusa.com/saos/searchao?SUBMIT=ao&AO=2 
212. 
    120.    See id.  
    121.    See id.  
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viability of the Flake opinion’s analysis of pre- and post-
qualification phases of the ballot measure campaign.  Based on the 
lack of consensus, ballot measure committees will have to continue 
to tread lightly when involving federal candidates in fundraising 
efforts.  This is especially true for ballot measure committees that 
do not have 501(c) tax status, but are instead section 527 political 
organizations under the tax code. 
3. Ballot Measures as “Elections” Under FECA 
The fundraising restrictions in section 441i(e)(1) only apply if 
the federal candidate or officeholder is soliciting money in 
connection with “an election for Federal office” or “any election 
other than an election for Federal office.”122  In many of these past 
advisory opinions, at least one Commissioner has expressed a 
dissenting view on the threshold question of whether or not ballot 
measures even constitute an “election” and trigger FECA.123  These 
Commissioners have argued that the statute is expressly limited to 
elections for public office and therefore does not cover any 
solicitations by federal candidates or officeholders to support or 
oppose ballot measures.124  This interpretation is based upon the 
statutory language125 as well as comments filed with the FEC by 
members of Congress in response to the Berman-Doolittle advisory 
opinion.  The members stated that their understanding when 
voting for BCRA was that these restrictions would not apply to 
ballot measures.126  Part of the difficulty with this determination is 
 122. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(e)(1)(A)-(B) (2000). 
 123. See Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2006-04 (Mar. 31, 2006) (dissenting 
opinion), available at http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/060004.html; Op. Fed. 
Election Comm’n 2005-10 (concurring opinion), available at http://ao.nictusa. 
com/ao/no/050010.html; Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2003-12 (July 29, 2003) 
(dissenting opinion), available at http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/03 
0012.html. 
 124. See Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2005-10 (concurring opinion), available at 
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/050010.html (“[B]allot initiatives and referenda 
are not elections for office as a matter of law under Section 441i(e) and, therefore, 
the statute’s soft-money fundraising restrictions do not apply to ballot measure 
activities.”). 
 125. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(1) (Supp. 2005) (defining “election” as “a general, 
special, primary, or runoff election,” a political party caucus or convention to 
nominate a candidate, a primary election to select delegates to a national political 
party convention, or a Presidential preference primary election); 11 C.F.R. § 
100.2(a) (2007) (defining “election” as “the process by which individuals . . . seek 
nomination for election, or election, to Federal office”). 
 126. 11 C.F.R. § 100.2(a). 
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caused by the different statutory formulations in different 
provisions that create ambiguity about whether ballot measure 
elections are governed by some, or all, of the FECA provisions.127  
Although the view that ballot measures are simply not “elections” 
governed by FECA has yet to command a majority of four 
Commissioners, this is an interpretation that could be accepted in 
the near future with the changing composition of the FEC.128  If 
that happens, then the distinctions discussed above between 
candidate EFMC’d committees and independent committees would 
no longer matter.  Consequently, federal candidates and 
officeholders could freely raise and spend money without 
limitation in connection with state ballot measures.  Thus, the law 
regarding federal candidates and officeholders’ involvement in 
state ballot measures is still a bit murky heading into the 2008 
election year.129
B. Electioneering Communications after FEC v. Wisconsin Right to 
Life 
BCRA prohibits the use of any corporate or labor organization 
funds to pay for electioneering communications.130  Broadcast 
television, cable, radio and satellite advertisements fall under this 
prohibition if the advertisement (1) refers to “a clearly identified 
candidate for Federal office,”  (2) is aired within sixty days before a 
 127. These different formulations include section 441i(e)’s “election for 
Federal office” and “election other than an election for Federal office,” section 
431(20)’s definition of certain types of Federal election activities as activities in 
connection with “an election in which a candidate for Federal office appears on 
the ballot,” section 441(b)’s prohibition on corporations, national banks, and 
labor organizations making contributions and expenditures in connection with 
“any election to any political office,” and section 441e’s prohibition on foreign 
nationals making a contribution in connection with “a Federal, State or local 
election.” 
 128. Although Commissioner Toner is no longer at the FEC, Commissioners 
Mason and von Spakovsky are current members who have expressed this view in 
the past.  In addition, there could emerge more support for this position when the 
vacant Republican seat is filled or the current recess appointments expire and are 
replaced with two new Democratic nominees and one new Republican nominee. 
 129. Given the difference of opinion of various past and current 
Commissioners regarding the proper statutory interpretation of § 441i(e) with 
regard to ballot measure campaigns, and the potential confusion created by the 
different formulations of statutory provisions cited above, this is an issue ripe for 
legislative clarification.  Any Congressional action to clarify the reach of FECA into 
ballot measure campaigns should strike the necessary balance and consider the 
constitutional implications of infringing on direct democracy.  See infra Part IV. 
 130. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a), (b)(2) (2000 & Supp. 2005); 11 C.F.R. § 114.2 (2007). 
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general election or thirty days before a primary election, and (3) is 
“targeted to the relevant electorate” of the referenced candidate 
(for House and Senate candidates).131  Individuals, associations, and 
other unincorporated entities are not prohibited from funding 
electioneering communications, but are subject to reporting and 
disclosing of their donations if they spend more than $10,000 on 
such advertisements in a calendar year.132  The FEC has statutory 
authority to make exemptions to this rule, so long as the provision 
does not exempt advertisements that “promote, support, attack, or 
oppose” (“PASO”) a federal candidate.133
These funding restrictions and reporting requirements can 
apply to radio and television advertisements supporting or 
opposing ballot measures which mention or feature a federal 
candidate.134  Since most ballot measures are included in federal 
primary or general elections, the electioneering communications 
time period covers the last thirty to sixty days before the public 
votes on that ballot measure.  Therefore, unincorporated ballot 
measure committees who wish to communicate to the public an 
endorsement of a ballot measure by a federal officeholder (who is 
also a candidate in that jurisdiction) in the days leading up to the 
election may be required to report donor information to the FEC if 
they spend past the $10,000 threshold.135  Unless the ballot measure 
committee sets up a segregated bank account that only pays for 
these advertisements, the report to the FEC must disclose the name 
of any donor who gave more than $1000 to the ballot measure 
committee from the first day of the preceding calendar year.136  
This level of disclosure might far exceed what recordkeeping and 
reporting is required at the state level.  Perhaps more importantly, 
if a ballot measure committee is incorporated, or takes corporate 
 131. 2 U.S.C. § 434f(3)(A)(i) (2000); see also 11 C.F.R. § 100.29 (2007).  
Communications that refer to a candidate for President or Vice President have 
specific requirements.  Id. § 100.29(b)(3)(ii). 
 132. 2 U.S.C. § 434f(1)–(2); see also 11 C.F.R. § 104.20 (2007) (detailing which 
forms should be used). 
 133. 2 U.S.C. § 434f(3)(A)(ii), (3)(B)(iv). 
 134. See Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2003-12, at 16–17 (July 29, 2003), available 
at http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/030012.html (applying electioneering 
communications funding restrictions and disclosure rules to ballot measure 
committee advertisements featuring a federal candidate). 
 135. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(b). 
 136. Id. at (c)(7).  If a segregated account is used, then the committee need 
only disclose donors to that account in the last calendar year.  Id.  See also id. at 
(c)(8). 
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and labor union donations (if permissible under relevant state 
law), the statute prohibits the committee from using corporate or 
labor funds to pay for these advertisements.137  These restrictions 
can be onerous for a ballot committee trying to get its message out 
to a statewide audience in the final weeks before the election. 
Unfortunately, the FEC specifically declined to create an 
exemption for ballot initiative advertisements stating that such 
advertisements could be considered to PASO a federal candidate.138  
This decision echoed the same concerns presented in the advisory 
opinions about candidate involvement in ballot measure 
campaigns:  “As ballot initiatives or referenda become increasingly 
linked with the public officials who support or oppose them, 
communications can use the initiatives or referenda as a proxy for 
the candidate, and in promoting or opposing the initiative or 
referendum, can promote or oppose the candidate.”139
Although ballot measure committees did not get a specific 
regulatory exemption, many of these advertisements may now be 
free of the corporate funding restrictions (and possibly the 
reporting requirements) for the 2008 election cycle after the U.S. 
Supreme Court holding in FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. 
(“WRTL”).140  In WRTL, a non-profit corporation challenged the 
electioneering communications funding prohibitions as 
unconstitutional as applied to specific “grassroots lobbying” 
advertisements that the group wanted to run mentioning a federal 
candidate within the electioneering communications timeframe.141  
The WRTL Court, now including Justice Alito instead of Justice 
O’Connor (who served on the McConnell Court), agreed that the 
application of the corporate funding prohibition was 
unconstitutional.142  The principal opinion by Chief Justice Roberts 
   137.    2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(2).  
 138. Final Rules on Electioneering Communications, 67 Fed. Reg. 65,190, 
65,202 (Oct. 23, 2002) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pts. 100, 114). 
 139. Id. 
 140. 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).  Others have endeavored to provide a full analysis 
of this recent decision and what it portends for campaign finance regulation in 
the era of the Roberts Court.  See, e.g. Hasen, Rethinking, supra note 23; Hasen, 
Buckley is Dead, supra note 34.  The case will be discussed here only briefly with 
regard to how it may open the door to advertisements for ballot measure 
committees that were previously restricted by the statute and FEC regulations. 
 141. See WRTL, 127 S. Ct. at 2660–61. 
 142. Id. at 2673.  This holding came after an initial decision in the prior 
Supreme Court term that McConnell did not preclude as-applied challenges to the 
electioneering communications provisions.  See Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. FEC, 546 
U.S. 410 (2006). 
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stated that it is only constitutional to subject an advertisement to 
the electioneering communications restrictions if the 
advertisement is the “functional equivalent” of “express 
advocacy.”143  Furthermore, the opinion provided a test: “a court 
should find that an ad is the functional equivalent of express 
advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable 
interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a 
specific candidate.”144  The Court held that the advertisements 
WRTL sought to run were lobbying advertisements seeking to 
shape public opinion about Senate filibusters of judicial 
nominations, and therefore may have been reasonably interpreted 
as something other than as an appeal to vote for or against the 
candidate named in the advertisement.145
Ballot measure committees in the 2008 election cycle can now 
use WRTL to support running some advertisements featuring 
federal candidates within the electioneering communications 
timeframes without being subject to the corporate funding 
restrictions in the statute.  This exemption would allow 
incorporated ballot measure committees to use their own general 
funds, and it would allow unincorporated committees to use 
corporate and labor union donations to fund these advertisements 
(if permissible under state law).  After WRTL, an advertisement 
supporting or opposing a ballot measure may not be 
constitutionally restricted so long as there is any “reasonable 
interpretation” of the advertisement other than as an appeal to vote 
for or against the federal candidate endorsing or opposing the 
ballot measure.  Surely, it is a “reasonable interpretation” that such 
an advertisement only seeks to influence support for, or opposition 
to, the proposed ballot measure, much like the WRTL 
advertisements sought to influence public opinion and the 
Senators’ position on judicial filibusters. 
The FEC acted quickly to implement the WRTL decision into 
 143. WTRL, 127 S. Ct. at 2659.  WRTL actually included four views: (1) the 
principal opinion written by Roberts and joined in full by Alito and in part by 
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas; (2) a brief concurrence written by Alito; (3) a 
concurrence written by Scalia and joined by Kennedy and Thomas; and (4) a 
dissent written by Souter and joined by Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer.  Scalia’s 
concurrence has three votes for overruling McConnell and invalidating the entire 
electioneering communications statutory provisions instead of crafting the “as-
applied” exemption in Robert’s opinion.  Id. at 2684. 
 144. Id. at 2667. 
 145. Id. at 2670. 
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its regulations governing electioneering communications before 
the 2008 electioneering communication windows started in early 
December 2007.146  The regulations approved by the FEC exempt 
advertisements that meet the WRTL test from the prohibition on 
use of corporate and labor organization funds, but continue to 
apply the electioneering communications disclosure 
requirements.147  The newly approved regulation restates the 
general test from Robert’s opinion: that corporations and labor 
organizations are prohibited from making electioneering 
communications only if “the communication is susceptible of no 
reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or 
against a clearly identified Federal candidate.”148  The regulation 
then includes a safe harbor provision, i.e., a description of certain 
types of advertisements that will be automatically deemed to meet 
the exemption if all three prongs of the safe harbor provision are 
met.149  Finally, the new regulation describes the FEC’s analysis for 
advertisements that do not qualify for the safe harbor, but might 
nonetheless be exempt under the general rule.150
Ballot measure committees can use this new WRTL exemption 
for advertisements supporting or opposing ballot measures and 
featuring federal candidates.  To qualify for the safe harbor, the 
advertisement must either: (1) urge a candidate to take a particular 
position on a legislative, executive or judicial issue or urge the 
public to take a position and contact a candidate about the issue; or 
(2) propose a commercial transaction, such as the purchase of a 
product or service or attendance at a commercial event for a fee.151  
Ballot measure advertisements with federal candidate 
endorsements would not likely meet this requirement because the 
advertisements would not be urging action by a candidate, but 
urging the public to vote for or against a ballot measure.  But, not 
 146. At the time this article went to press, the FEC had approved regulatory 
text, but not yet issued its “Explanation and Justification” of the rules or published 
the regulations in the Federal Register.  See Final Rules Approved at November 20, 
2007 FEC Open Session, available at http://www.fec.gove/pdf/nprm/election 
eering_comm/2007/provisions_approved_nov-20-2007.pdf. 
 147. Id. at 3 (modifying the electioneering funding prohibitions in 
forthcoming 11 C.F.R. section 114.2(b) and creating a new exemption in 
forthcoming 11 C.F.R. section 114.15). 
 148. Id. at 7–8 (setting forth requirements for the new safe harbor in 
forthcoming 11 C.F.R. section 114.15(b)). 
 149. Id. at 7. 
 150. Id. at 8–9. 
 151. Id. at 7–8. 
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qualifying for the safe harbor does not preclude such 
advertisements from qualifying for the general exemption under 
the FEC’s new rule. 
Ballot measure committee advertisements that focus on the 
measure to be voted on—instead of the candidacy of the federal 
candidate or officeholder appearing in the advertisement—should 
fall within the general WRTL exemption under the two-factor test 
described in section 114.15(c) of the FEC’s new regulation.  Under 
this regulation, the FEC considers whether an advertisement has 
“indicia of express advocacy” or “content that would support a 
determination that a communication has an interpretation other 
than as an appeal to vote for or against a clearly identified Federal 
candidate.”152  The new rule states that an advertisement will be 
deemed to have “indicia of express advocacy” if it mentions an 
election, candidacy, political party, opposing candidate, or voting 
by the general public, or it takes a position on a candidate’s 
character, qualifications, or fitness for office.153  Therefore, an 
advertisement endorsing a ballot measure that urges the public to 
vote for that measure could be deemed to have “indicia of express 
advocacy” under this first factor because it “mentions . . . voting by 
the general public.”154  But the same ballot measure endorsement 
could contain one of the three types of content listed in the second 
factor by including “a call to action or other appeal that 
interpreted in conjunction with the rest of the communication 
urges an action other than voting for or against or contributing to a 
clearly identified Federal candidate or political party.”155  Ballot 
measure committees should be able to meet this provision by 
tailoring the advertisement to focus on urging a vote on the ballot 
measure instead of commenting on the election of the candidate 
appearing in the advertisement.  Balancing these two factors 
together, ballot measure committees should be able to claim that 
their advertisements featuring a federal candidate have a 
“reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote” for or 
against that candidate.156  The FEC should issue additional 
guidance and examples in a Federal Register document in the near 
future which ballot measure committees should consult when 
 152. Id. at 8. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. at 9. 
 156. Id. at 7. 
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creating such advertisements in order to take advantage of this 
exemption. 
WRTL has arguably removed most of the restrictions that 
BCRA’s electioneering communications provisions placed on ballot 
measure committee advertisements featuring a federal candidate.  
Therefore, ballot measure committees should not have to worry 
much about these provisions in the 2008 election cycle, especially if 
they spend under the $10,000 reporting threshold.  If a ballot 
measure committee spends over the reporting threshold, the new 
FEC regulations create a slightly different reporting requirement 
for incorporated entities than unincorporated groups.  An 
incorporated ballot measure committee is only required to disclose 
the names of individual donors who gave the committee over $1000 
in the prior calendar year expressly for the purpose of furthering 
electioneering communications.157  General donations to the ballot 
measure committee need not be itemized under the new rules, 
although the committee must still file the rest of the FEC’s 
required report for electioneering communications within a day of 
the date of the first public distribution of the advertisement that 
triggers the reporting threshold.158  The reporting requirements for 
unincorporated entities described above were not substantively 
changed, and a separate bank account may still be used to limit the 
donors subject to reporting.159  Additional guidance regarding the 
scope of the reporting obligations for advertisements that qualify 
for this new WRTL exemption should be available when the FEC 
publishes its complete document in the Federal Register. 
C. Restrictions on State and Local Parties Conducting Federal Election 
Activity 
Generally speaking, state and local political parties may not 
use soft money to pay for any FEA, a term that encompasses a large 
amount of voter mobilization and communications traditionally 
handled at the state or local level.160  FEA must be funded with 
federal funds or a specific allocation of federal funds and “Levin 
funds.”161  This compromise in BCRA allows state and local parties 
to use some funds that are not fully compliant with FECA, but are 
 157. Id. at 1–2 (new provision 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(c)(9)). 
 158. See 11 C.F.R. § 104.20(b) (2007). 
 159. See Final Rules, supra note 138, at 1–2. 
 160. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(1) (Supp. 2005); 11 C.F.R. § 300.33 (2007). 
   161.    2 U.S.C. § 441i(b).  
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raised and spent pursuant to different restrictions.  Levin funds 
must be raised within the limits of state campaign finance law and 
in amounts no greater than $10,000 per calendar year per 
person.162  These funds may only be raised by the committee that 
spends the funds (i.e., no transfers between different party 
committees or organizations and no fundraising by national parties 
or federal candidates is allowed).163  State and local party 
committees who conduct FEA may also be required to submit 
detailed reports about Levin funds spent and raised.164
Unlike electioneering communications, the funding 
restrictions on FEA do not depend upon a reference to a federal 
candidate.165  Therefore, some activity conducted by state and local 
political parties to support or oppose ballot measures can be 
subjected to the FEA funding rules even if no federal candidates 
are involved or mentioned.166  BCRA created a structure where 
there are four types of FEA:  voter registration activity (Type I); 
voter identification, get-out-the-vote activity, and generic campaign 
activity (Type II); public communications that PASO a clearly 
identified federal office (Type III); and services provided by an 
employee of a state or local party who spends more than 25% of 
their time on activities in connection with a federal election (Type 
IV).167  Different funding rules apply to each type of FEA:  Types I 
and II FEA may be funded with an allocated combination of federal 
and Levin funds, whereas Types III and IV FEA must be funded 
completely with federal funds.168  The allocation ratios take into 
account the composition of the ballot in any particular election 
year to vary the percentage of federal funds required.  For 
example, in a Presidential election year with a Senate candidate on 
 162. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(iii); 11 C.F.R. § 300.31. 
 163. 2 U.S.C. §§ 441i(b)(2)(B)(iv), (b)(2)(C); 11 C.F.R. §§ 300.31(a), (e). 
 164. 11 C.F.R. § 300.36(b)(2) (requiring party committees that are also 
political committees must report FEA receipts and disbursements for both federal 
and Levin funds if they aggregate more than $5000 in a calendar year). 
 165. See 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(B)(i); 11 C.F.R. § 300.32(c)(1) (noting that FEA 
referring to a clearly identified federal candidate may not be funded with Levin 
funds and must be paid for solely with federal funds). 
 166. Although the FEA rules targeted at State and local party activity, the scope 
of the activity considered “FEA” also affects the ability of federal candidates and 
officeholders to fundraise for 501(c) nonprofit corporations as discussed above 
with regard to the Flake advisory opinion and pending advisory opinion request 
2007-28. 
 167. 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(i)–(iv) (Supp. 2005); 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(b)(1)–(4) 
(2007). 
 168. 2 U.S.C. § 441i(b)(2)(A); 11 C.F.R. § 300.32(b). 
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the ballot in that state, a minimum of 36% federal funds must be 
used, whereas in a year where neither a Presidential or Senate 
candidate appears on the ballot in that state only 15% federal 
funds is required.169  These funding restrictions and reporting 
requirements have already started to deter state and local parties 
from funding activity that would be considered FEA.170
State and local parties who conduct voter registration drives in 
connection with a ballot measure campaign may trigger the FEA 
funding and reporting restrictions.171  Type I FEA covers “voter 
registration activity” within 120 calendar days before a federal 
primary or general election.172  The statute does not define the 
term, but FEC regulations state that Type I FEA covers “contacting 
individuals by telephone, in person, or by other individualized 
means to assist them in registering to vote.”173  The regulation 
includes examples such as distributing registration forms and 
assisting individuals in completing and filing the forms.174  Thus, 
the typical canvasser who goes door-to-door, or stands outside a 
supermarket with voter registration forms and information 
supporting or opposing a ballot measure, could qualify as Type I 
FEA so long as the activity occurs in the 120 days leading up to the 
election. 
State or local party efforts to identify voters sympathetic to the 
party’s position on particular ballot measures could also constitute 
Type II FEA (get-out-the-vote, voter identification or generic party 
activity).  Similar to the voter registration definition, get-out-the-
vote activities include contacting voters “by telephone, in person, 
or by other individualized means, to assist them in engaging in the 
 169. 11 C.F.R. § 300.33(b). 
 170. See, e.g., Letter from Mark Brewer, President, Ass’n of State Democratic 
Chairs, to FEC, available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/fea_definition/comm_ 
03.pdf (last visited Dec. 27, 2007) (commenting on proposed FEA rulemaking); 
Letter from Scott R. Falmlen, President, Ass’n of State Democratic Executive 
Directors, to FEC (Sept. 28, 2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/ 
fea_definition/comm_09.pdf (commenting to FEC regarding proposed FEA 
rulemaking); Letter from Darryl Tattrie, CommonCentsConsulting, to FEC (Sept. 
29, 2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/fea_definition/comm_ 
10.pdf (commenting to FEC regarding proposed FEA rulemaking). 
 171. See Op. Fed. Election Comm’n 2003-12, at 15 (July 29, 2003), available at 
http://ao.nictusa.com/ao/no/030012.html (applying FEA provisions to various 
communications by ballot measure committee). 
 172. 2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(i); 11 C.F.R. 100.24(b)(1). 
 173. 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(2). 
 174. Id. 
36
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2008], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol34/iss2/6
5. PERL - ADC.docm 2/3/2008  2:31:46 PM 
2008] DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND INDIRECT REGULATION 627 
                                                          
act of voting.”175  Specific examples in the regulation include 
providing voters with the date of the election, times and locations 
of polling places, or offering to transport people from the polls.176  
Thus, phone call reminders from the state party to voters telling 
them the date and times of the election and urging them to vote 
“yes” or “no” on a particular ballot measure could be considered a 
get-out-the-vote activity.177  FEA voter identification includes 
acquiring voter lists and adding information about the likelihood 
of voting in an upcoming election that a state or local party might 
gather to indicate support for or opposition to a ballot measure in 
an upcoming election.178  Finally, generic campaign activity includes 
public communications that promote or oppose a political party 
without mentioning any federal or non-federal candidates.179  
Therefore, a mass mailing supporting a political party and 
promoting the party’s position on an upcoming ballot measure 
could meet this definition. 
Type II FEA is not subject to the 120-day rule discussed above 
with regard to voter registration activity, but instead is determined 
by a particular period of time in each state based on the earliest 
filing deadline for access to a primary election in that state.180  The 
Type II FEA time period runs from that filing deadline through to 
the general election, and therefore can encompass a large portion 
of any election year.181  Any activity conducted during that time 
period that otherwise meets the definition of get-out-the-vote, voter 
identification, or generic campaign activity will be considered Type 
II FEA even if the activity is targeted at a ballot measure campaign 
 175. Id. at (a)(3). 
 176. Id. at (i)–(ii). 
 177. The scope of this provision was discussed in Advisory Opinion 2006-19, 
where the FEC decided that certain direct mail and pre-recorded telephone calls 
to registered Democrats before a joint state and federal election did not constitute 
get-out-the-vote activities because (1) the communications only promoted non-
federal candidates; (2) the communications were four or more days before the 
election; (3) these “form letter” communications were not targeted to subsets of 
Democratic voters; and (4) the communications only contained the date of the 
election without the individual voter’s polling locations or times. 
 178. 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(4). 
 179. Id. § 100.25. 
 180. Id. § 100.24(a)(1).  The statutory limitation on Type II FEA was that this 
activity must be “in connection with an election in which a candidate for Federal 
office appears on the ballot.”  2 U.S.C. § 431(20)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2005).  FEC 
regulations implemented this statutory provision as a timeframe requirement. 
   181.    Id. § 100.24(a)(1)(i).     
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and does not mention federal races.182  Because this is a fairly large 
window, most voter mobilization activity leading up to a ballot 
measure election would most likely be covered in this timeframe 
and could be subject to the FEA funding restrictions and reporting 
requirements. 
During the most recent FEA rulemaking, some state parties 
expressed concern that activity in connection with wholly local 
elections, e.g., mayoral elections or ballot measure elections, were 
improperly classified as FEA under this approach just because that 
local election fell within the larger Type II FEA time period.183  In 
response, the FEC created a regulatory exemption for voter 
identification and get-out-the-vote activities conducted in 
connection with a local election held on a different day than any 
federal election if the activity referred exclusively to non-federal 
candidates, ballot measures, or the date and polling times and 
locations for the local election.184  This exemption would cover 
some state and local party activity regarding ballot measures, but 
only when that election is held separate and apart from the federal 
election.185  Moreover, this exemption was created with a sunset 
date of September 1, 2007.186  Although the FEC has issued a notice 
of proposed rulemaking to make the exemption permanent (and 
possibly expand the exemption), the current exemption on the 
books has expired and a new rule has not yet been publicly 
released.187
Unfortunately, there are no definitive answers as to what ballot 
measure voter mobilization efforts by state and local parties might 
be covered under the FEA regulations.  Adding to the uncertainty 
   182.    Id. § 100.24(b)(2); Interim Final Rule on the Definition of Federal 
Election Activity, 71 Fed. Reg. 14357, 14359 (March 22, 2006) (stating that the 
FEA restrictions apply to "efforts related to non-Federal elections that simply 
happen to fall within the Type II FEA time periods.").   
 183. See, e.g., Letter from Lance H. Olson, General Counsel, Cal. Democratic 
Party, to FEC (June 3, 2005), available at http://www.fec.gov/pdf/nprm/fea_ 
definition/comm_06.pdf (commenting to FEC regarding rulemaking). 
 184. 11 C.F.R. § 100.24(a)(1)(iii)(A) (2007). 
   185.     Id.   
 186. Id. § 100.24(a)(1)(iii)(B). 
 187. See Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on FEA and Non-Federal Elections, 
72 Fed. Reg. 31,473 (proposed June 7, 2007) (to be codified at 11 C.F.R. pt. 100) 
(noting that even the proposed revised exemption would only apply to ballot 
measures which were voted on in wholly separate elections from any federal 
primary or general election, and it is unclear how many states would hold such 
separate elections in 2008 apart from the Presidential primary, congressional 
primaries, and November general election). 
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is a recent U.S. District Court opinion striking down the FEC’s 
regulatory definitions of “voter registration activity” and get-out-the-
vote activities as too narrow and not covering enough state and local 
activity.188  Pending appeal or a new FEC rulemaking, however, the 
current definitions remain on the books and in force for the 2008 
elections.189  This uncertainty may be enough to keep state and 
local parties away from any voter mobilization efforts in support of, 
or opposition to, a ballot measure that could be considered FEA.  
But given the increased political party involvement with ballot 
measures, it is more likely that local parties might unknowingly 
stumble into federal reporting and funding obligations while 
advocating their positions on a local ballot measure.190
IV. STRIKING THE NECESSARY BALANCE 
The recent requests for advisory opinions on the application of 
BCRA to state ballot measure-related activities foreshadow the 
conflicts that are likely to arise as federal regulation expands to 
cover more activities with a potential impact on state elections, 
rather than just activities expressly directed at the federal races at 
issue in a particular election cycle.  Other election reform 
proposals that have been considered in recent years have brought 
with them the same risks of conflict.  For example, a reform 
measure recently proposed to regulate the activities of 
“unregistered” section 527 organizations would have required all 
state ballot measure committees to register as federal political 
committees and follow federal source and amount restrictions if 
 188. See Shays v. FEC, No. 06-1247, 2007 WL 2616689 at *83–86 (D.D.C. Sept. 
12, 2007) (memorandum opinion) (holding the FEC’s definitions of “voter 
registration activity” and “get-out-the-vote” activities unduly compromises the Act 
in violation of Chevron step two and failed the APA’s reasoned decision making 
requirement). 
 189. Id. at 93–94 (refusing to enjoin the operation of the regulations pending 
appeal or further rulemaking). 
 190. The FEA rules also apply to an “association or similar group of candidates 
for state or local office or of individuals holding state or local office.”  See 2 U.S.C. 
§ 441i(b)(1) (2000), invalidated by McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176 (2003); 
11 C.F.R. § 300.32(a)(1) (2007).  Because these groups are not allowed to raise or 
spend Levin funds, any FEA voter mobilization activity done by this type of group 
supporting or opposing a ballot measure would be required to be paid for with all 
federal funds.  11 C.F.R. § 3003.32(a)(1).  The FEC attempted to exempt these 
groups from the definitions of “get-out-the-vote” and “voter identification,” but 
removed those exemptions after a U.S. District Court struck these regulations 
down as contrary to Congressional intent in BCRA.  See Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 
2d 28, 104, 107 n.83 (D.D.C. 2004). 
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they conducted get-out-the-vote or voter registration campaigns in 
conjunction with a ballot measure election held simultaneously 
with an election for federal office.191
These federal regulatory efforts stem from legitimate concerns 
that the federal system of limiting contributions cannot work if 
there are avenues through which unregulated money can have 
substantial influence on elections.  The 2004 presidential election 
provided an excellent example of the effect that initiative measures 
on hot-button issues like gay marriage can have on driving turnout 
of voters likely to support the candidates of a particular political 
party.192  To the extent that political operatives arrange for the 
presence of “sham” initiatives on the ballot in order to skew the 
results of candidate elections, federal regulation of such initiatives 
seems to be justified on the same basis as regulation of federal 
election activity.  Increasing strategic involvement of candidates 
directly in ballot measure activities likewise justifies consideration 
of the candidate corruption concerns that were once thought to be 
absent from the regulation of ballot measure issues.  The most 
notable example of this phenomenon is California Governor 
Arnold Schwarzenegger’s unabashed fundraising and advocacy for 
ballot measures to strengthen both his political base for re-election 
and his bargaining position vis-à-vis the California Legislature.193
Each of these bases for regulation turns on certain 
assumptions about the intent of the political actors engaged in 
these activities.  We recognize as problems each of the putative 
problems addressed above because of our implicit assumption that 
the placement of “wedge issue” ballot measures in a presidential 
year or the involvement of an elected official with ballot measure 
campaigns is undertaken for the nefarious purpose of evading 
otherwise-applicable campaign finance restrictions.  But it is equally 
possible that ballot measures on controversial social issues appear 
on the ballot at the same time that candidates are discussing those 
issues in their campaigns, simply because those issues are 
something that voters actually care about.   Therefore, they attract 
 191. H.R. 513, 108th Cong. § 2 (2006) (referring to organizations described in 
section 527 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986); Municipal Debt Refinancing 
Act, S. 271, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 192. See Garrett, supra note 57, at 1101–02.  See generally STEPHEN P. 
NICHOLSON, VOTING THE AGENDA:  CANDIDATES, ELECTIONS, AND BALLOT 
PROPOSITIONS (2005) (analyzing the interrelationships between candidates and 
ballot measure elections). 
 193. See Garrett, supra note 57, at 1105–07. 
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both direct policy proposals and candidate attention.  For example, 
an elected official may be involved in ballot measure elections 
precisely because she has been unable to advance a particular 
proposal through ordinary legislation, and she is taking that issue 
to the voters out of a sense of public stewardship and desire to 
advance her policy agenda.  Sorting out legitimate ballot measure 
activity from illegitimate activities requires the kind of intent-based 
analysis that the Supreme Court has eschewed in the campaign 
finance context.  Accordingly, writing a narrowly tailored 
regulation that applies to only illegitimate activities, without 
including an intent element, would be impossible. 
Thus, any federal regulation of state ballot measure activities 
based on the theory that they provide convenient cover for those 
who would avoid restrictions on contributions would likely need to 
sweep broadly and cover all initiatives.  Assuming that such 
regulation could clear the First Amendment hurdle recognized in 
the First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti and Citizens Against Rent 
Control v. City of Berkeley cases, it would still need to justify the 
substantial federal intrusion into state governance that such a 
regulation would constitute.  No federal court decision has ever 
held that direct democracy at the state level violates any federal 
constitutional provision.194  It is difficult to see how such a 
conclusion could be reached in light of the Framers’ own 
insistence on popular ratification of the Constitution, not to 
mention Congress’ express endorsement of, at least, the legislative 
referendum at the state level.195  In a federal system, at least some 
deference is due to the legitimate choices of state governments 
about the conduct of state government itself.  Absent constitutional 
violations, and given our founding commitment to consent of the 
governed as a fundamental basis for the legitimacy of government, 
it is hard to frame an argument that direct democracy is per se 
illegitimate.196  Any federal regulation of state ballot measure 
 194. In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, the Supreme Court 
refused to accept jurisdiction of a Guarantee Clause challenge to state initiative 
lawmaking based on the political question doctrine.  223 U.S. 118, 151 (1912). 
 195. See U.S. CONST. art. VII; WATERS, supra note 10, at 3; THE FEDERALIST NO. 
49, supra note 122, at 339; Budge, supra note 122; DuVivier, supra note 10, at 229–
30; see also Robert G. Natalson, Initiative & Referendum & the Republican Form of 
Government, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 17 (M. Dane Waters ed., 
2001).  But see Engberg, supra note 17, at 578 (contending that Congress could 
regulate or even eliminate ballot initiatives under its Guarantee Clause authority). 
 196. Cf. DuVivier, supra note 100, at 248–52 (arguing that ballot measures 
addressing areas in which legislation generally fails and initiatives are particularly 
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activity would therefore have to acknowledge the legitimacy of the 
underlying system and comply with the ordinary constitutional 
requirement that it not sweep more broadly than necessary in 
remedying whatever ills formed the justification for federal 
action.197
Any federal regulation of state ballot measures should also be 
conducted with a well-supported, nuanced understanding of how 
ballot measure politics actually operate.198  Reformers in this area 
tend to paint the evils of direct democracy with a broad brush, 
citing the influx of large-dollar corporate and union contributions 
as a proxy for the existence of actual corruption and voter 
confusion.  Real data about the operation of the initiative paints a 
more complex picture.  For example, while more money in a race 
may actually result in greater odds of victory (and thereby raise 
equality concerns), in the initiative context, it does not have a 
direct effect on success.  Solid empirical evidence demonstrates 
that spending on ballot measure campaigns has more effect when 
that spending is on the side opposed to the measure, perhaps 
because those efforts benefit from the voters’ predisposition to vote 
“no” on ballot measures.199  The spectral image of big money 
interests forcing legislation through the initiative process therefore 
does not seem to hold true, at least not as a universal matter.  Nor 
do all initiatives operate to the disadvantage of minority groups, as 
exemplified by successful pro-rights initiatives and the defeat of 
anti-rights initiatives even in states where the political composition 
of the electorate would portend a different result.200  Moreover, at 
least some of the concerns about the majoritarian nature of 
 
useful, such as political reform, matters of health and safety traditionally reserved 
to states, and areas appropriate for social experimentation are due particular 
deference). 
 197. See SAMUEL ISSACHAROFF, PAMELA S. KARLAN, & RICHARD H. PILDES, THE 
LAW OF DEMOCRACY 539–40 (1998) (discussing constitutional limitations). 
 198. See generally Briffault, Ballot Propositions, supra note 57, at 432–38 (detailing 
the logistical problems of campaign finance regulation in the ballot measure 
context); Elisabeth R. Gerber, The Logic of Reform: Assessing Initiative Reform 
Strategies, in DANGEROUS DEMOCRACY: THE BATTLE OVER BALLOT INITIATIVES IN 
AMERICA 143 (Larry J. Sabato, Howard R. Ernst, & Bruce A. Larson, eds., 2001) 
(analyzing various reform proposals in light of empirical evidence about ballot 
measure politics). 
 199. Briffault, Ballot Propositions, supra note 57, at 427; Elizabeth Garrett & 
Elizabeth R. Gerber, Money in the Initiative & Referendum Process: Evidence of Its Effects 
& Prospects for Reform, in THE BATTLE OVER CITIZEN LAWMAKING 73, 79 (M. Dane 
Waters ed., 2001). 
 200. DuVivier, supra note 100, at 242. 
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governance by initiative can be resolved by the power of judicial 
review, which extends even to initiatives, rather than by increasing 
regulation of direct democracy. 
In addition, any regulation that affects direct democracy 
should consider the benefits of direct democracy, so that it might 
avoid unintended consequences that would reduce or eliminate 
those benefits.  Direct democracy has been shown to increase voter 
turnout and engagement, which in turn operates to the benefit of 
candidate elections and the overall perception of government’s 
legitimacy.201  Direct democracy has also provided a historically 
effective bypass for the kinds of political reform that elected 
representatives are unlikely to accomplish, including campaign 
finance reform itself, and as a forum for social experimentation at 
the state level.202  Aligning ballot measure elections so that they use 
the same structure of contribution limits as candidate elections 
increases the likelihood of capture by the same political actors who 
spend money and exert influence in candidate elections, rather 
than providing an alternative avenue for otherwise unrepresented 
interests to accomplish what they cannot accomplish through the 
normal legislative process.  Even those who fear that ballot measure 
campaigns have been captured by big-money interests surely do not 
wish to lose the possibility of enacting reforms that those currently 
in power will not impose on themselves.  Instead, a “hybrid 
democracy” system, in which both representative and direct 
democracy play a vibrant role, can result in better outcomes and 
more respect for the will of the people.203
Perhaps most importantly, direct democracy is a concrete 
recognition of the foundational principle that democratic 
government requires the consent of the governed, and that the 
governed therefore have the right to choose the way in which they 
will be governed—including the choice to reserve legislative 
authority for themselves.  Citizens’ use of that reserved legislative 
power need not always be perfect to be worthy of respect.  In the 
words of political theorist Michael Walzer, the citizenry’s claim on 
 201. Id. at 236; see also David B. Magleby, Ballot Initiatives & Intergovernmental 
Relations in the United States, 28 PUBLIUS 147, 148–151 (1998) (contending that 
availability of the initiative results in more responsive elected officials). 
 202. See Garrett, supra note 57, at 1112; DuVivier, supra note 10, at 238. 
 203. See Garrett, supra note 57 (describing “hybrid democracy”); see also 
THOMAS E. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, 
REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 246–51 (1989) (advocating a “mixed model” of 
democracy). 
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the authority to rule does not rest on “their knowledge of the 
truth.”204  Rather, the people “may not know the right thing to do, 
but they claim a right to do what they think is right . . . .  [I]t is a 
feature of democratic government that the people have a right to 
act wrongly.”205  Individual reformers, and even elected 
representative bodies, should think twice before imposing 
regulations on this retained authority simply because they disagree 
with some of the ways in which it is used. 
V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RECOMMENDATIONS 
From the history of campaign finance regulation in the United 
States to date, one thing seems true: because people who live and 
work here have an interest in the outcome of governmental 
decisions, they have an interest in influencing elections, and they 
are willing to spend money to do it.  Those who are particularly 
committed to influencing elections and governmental outcomes 
will be creative in their attempts to gain advantage inside (and 
sometimes outside) the boundaries imposed by whatever regulatory 
system is in place.  This is the constant struggle of campaign 
finance reform efforts. 
Now that federal campaign finance regulation has reached its 
current breadth, attempts to snuff out evasive contribution 
restrictions inevitably conflict with the lesser and different 
restrictions on related areas of political activity, including direct 
democracy.  Both the application of current law and any further 
attempts at reform will proceed best by a careful consideration of 
the interests at stake in both federal regulation and citizen 
participation in direct democracy.  This approach—provided that it 
relies on actual information about how ballot measure campaigns 
affect elections—will preserve the societal benefits of direct 
democracy, respect the balance of powers in our federal system, 
and avoid overbroad and unconstitutional restrictions on the core 
political speech through which the governed express consent and 
provide direction to their governments. 
 
 
   204.    Michael Walzer, Philosophy & Democracy, 9 POL. THEORY 379, 383 (1981). 
   205. Id. at 385. 
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